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ibertarians (like me) generally disagree with orthodox 
Rawlsians (like Samuel Freeman) about whether 
Rawlsian principles of distributive justice are 
compatible with libertarianism.1 In this essay, I set out 
to explain why. In section 1, I describe the problem, 
which is essentially that libertarians think the Rawlsian framework 
does not rule out anti-statist, capitalist, and broadly libertarian 
approaches to distributive justice and orthodox Rawlsians think 
that it does. I propose that this problem arises because the 
Rawlsian framework is underspecified in two ways. First, the 
Rawlsian framework has a lot of moving parts, so people with 
different pre-theoretical intuitions can use Rawls’s theory, without 
error, to arrive at very different conclusions. I make this point in 
section 2. Second, orthodox Rawlsians advance justice as fairness 
at an intermediate level of idealization. In section 3, I argue that 
pitching the theory at this level inherits many of the problems with 
 
1 I’m using the term libertarian to refer to libertarians but also people who are 
classical liberals, and anarchists. I realize these terms are imperfect. Basically, I’m 
referring to political philosophers who are especially pro-market and anti-state. 
This term contrasts with what I’m calling Orthodox Rawlsians, who are 
comparatively less friendly to markets and more statist. 
L 
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a non-ideal approach that addresses specific problems with the 
status quo as well as the problems with a purely ideal approach that 
addresses the motivating ideals and values. This approach also 
obscures more than it illuminates to the extent that it is often 
unclear whether arguments at this level of analysis are justified on 
principled or pragmatic grounds.  
Together, these two kinds of under-specification result in a 
theory that is indeterminate between competing conceptions of 
distributive justice. Since the theory cannot specify which 
conception of distributive justice is preferable, then proponents of 
competing conceptions must either defend a more determinate 
interpretation of the theory or defend their conception of 
distributive justice on the grounds that do not rely on Rawlsian 
premises. In section 4, I argue that proponents of competing 
conceptions of distributive justice should defend their views 
without reference to the Rawlsian framework. I favor this 
approach because attempts at defending more determinate 
interpretations of the Rawlsian theory shift the terms of debate 
from a discussion about distributive justice to a discussion about 
Rawlsian exegesis and interpretation. But exegetical disputes often 
reflect substantive disagreements about what distributive justice 
requires, rather than the other way around. Since Rawlsian 
interpretation supervenes on underlying disagreements about 
distributive justice, Rawlsian scholars who disagree about Rawlsian 
distributive justice are more likely to identify the crux of their 
disagreement by talking about distributive justice than by talking 
about Rawls.  
It is for these reasons that I view Rawlsian distributive justice 
as a mirror. When libertarians look at the framework, they can see 
their own values staring back at them. Liberal egalitarians take a 
look and assert that the picture they see is quite different. Both 
sides report what they see in the mirror without error. Yet, it would 
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be an error to suggest that the image in the mirror is fixed. And it 
is an even greater mistake to think that the image in the mirror can 




In Liberalism and Distributive Justice, Samuel Freeman situates the 
disagreement between libertarians and liberal egalitarians as 
primarily a disagreement about three things – the value of equality, 
the status of economic freedom, and the legitimacy of public 
power.2 Yet most libertarians, classical liberals, and anarchists are 
as committed to equality as Rawlsians (if not more so), but they 
believe in a different interpretation of what equality requires. 
Libertarians reply that the same reasons for the non-basic status of 
economic freedom would also weigh against the basic status of 
core liberal freedoms, such as freedom of speech and association.3 
In response to Freeman’s concerns about private power, 
libertarians reply that the reasons Freeman gives for the 
illegitimacy of private law enforcement weigh with equal force 
against public power as it operates in most contexts.4  
These debates are well-worn within the libertarian/orthodox 
Rawlsian egalitarian discourse. I am not the first to point out that 
 
2 By this I mean that Freeman argues against libertarianism, or a more general 
laissez-faire economic approach on the grounds that it does not account for 
distributional equality (Freeman 2018, 180-184) that it recognizes economic 
freedom as a basic liberty (ibid., 170), and that it denies the legitimacy of public 
exercises of power while viewing private contracts as presumptively legitimate 
(ibid. 62-89). 
3 Cf. Flanigan 2018.  
4 Cf. Freiman 2017. 
Philosophy and Public Issues – Liberalism and Social Justice 
72 
 
a great deal of the Rawlsian architecture does not necessarily rule 
out libertarianism, despite the claims of most orthodox Rawlsians. 
Tomasi’s argument that economic liberties should be considered 
basic liberties is perhaps the most influential entry in this genre. 
Tomasi argues that economic liberties, like other basic liberties, are 
important for the development of citizens’ moral powers. The 
moral powers refer to the capacity for citizens to develop and 
pursue a conception of the good and to recognize others’ 
entitlements to do the same.5 Jason Brennan argues that, 
empirically, societies with high levels of economic freedom also 
seem to promote Rawlsian aims better than societies that restrict 
economic freedom.6 In policy circles, many libertarians make the 
case capitalism is generally to the benefit of the least advantaged 
relative to other economic systems, and that restrictions on 
economic freedom are counter-productive.7 Chris Freiman argues 
that Rawlsians should either be more skeptical of political liberty 
or more open to economic freedom because, in non-ideal contexts, 
both fail to promote justice for similar reasons. 8 Loren Lomaski 
re-imagines to the Rawlsian framework to show that it could 
plausibly support fairly Nozickian conclusions.9 And I’ve argued 
elsewhere that orthodox Rawlsians should uphold seemingly 
illiberal unconscionable for egalitarian reasons—to avoid black 
markets and governmental paternalism.10 
Whatever one thinks of the merits of these arguments, they are 
clearly granting the premises of Rawlsian liberalism. So why do 
proponents Rawlsian accounts of distributive justice, like Freeman, 
 
5 Cf. Tomasi 2013.  
6 Cf. Brennan 2012.  
7 See e,g. humanprogress.org, which describes the benefits of economic 
liberalism.  
8 Cf. Freiman 2017. 
9 Cf. Lomasky 2005. 
10 Cf. Flanigan 2017. 
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persist in rejecting libertarianism as an admissible theory of justice? 
And why have libertarians, like me, failed to see why the Rawlsian 
account of distributive justice rules out their views? The answer to 
both questions is that the Rawlsian framework is under-specified 
and intractable, despite Rawls and Rawlsian’s considerable efforts 
at clarifying, defining, and defending the view. Actually, the fact 
that clarifying, defining, and defending the view has occupied so 
much of the twentieth, and now twenty-first-century political 
philosophy is further evidence of the under-specification and 
intractability of the framework. 
 
II 
Extensional Adequacy, Parsimony, and Specification 
Justice as fairness, like all philosophical models of justice, is a 
model.11 Models make it easier to understand complex processes 
by representing the world in a simpler way. For example, models 
in science and social science help people understand why things 
happen the way they do, or they predict what might happen under 
certain conditions.12 In philosophy, a good model can help people 
 
11 Rawls 1971, 52. 
12 For example, good separation-of-powers models are similar to the 
governmental institutions they represent. They include the most relevant 
participants in policymaking but not all stakeholders or influencers. They 
represent participants' preferences over policy outcomes as convex preferences 
for an ideal point on a scale of possible policies, even though such scales rarely 
represent any actual policy, and participants' preferences over alternatives may 
not be symmetrical or convex. They describe the rules that participants must 
follow to pass policy but fail to capture informal social norms. Yet even though 
these models do not include all the information about policymaking that could 
be relevant, they are very informative at predicting policy outcomes and 
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understand how concepts hang together and how different views 
have different tradeoffs.13 As Williamson writes, models are 
especially helpful in branches of philosophy that deal with “the 
human world in all its complexity and mess,” where we are unlikely 
to discover exceptionless general principles but where we can still 
learn about underlying human phenomena by developing better 
models.14 Since political philosophy is exceptionally focused on the 
human world in all its complexity, model building is an especially 
promising approach for political philosophers. Rawls, who was 
very influenced by economic modeling, models justice through the 
mechanism of the original position.15  
Principles of good modeling provide several methodological 
desiderata for political philosophers who are interested in building 
models to discover the truth about justice.16 For our purposes, let’s 
focus on three—extensional adequacy, parsimony, and 
specification. Consider first extensional adequacy or intuitive 
plausibility. Intuitions play a central role in ethical theorizing.17 
Some philosophers suggest that people cannot avoid using 
intuitions about cases when answering questions about 
 
understanding why public officials make the choices they do. Cf. Krehbiel 1998; 
Cameron 2000.  
13 Cf. Sellars 1963. 
14 Cf. Williamson forthcoming. 
15 Cf. Forrester 2019, Wolff 2015. 
16 For a more comprehensive discussion of theoretical virtues in explanatory 
models, see Schindler 2018. 
17 For example, Rawls's influential method of reflective equilibrium is generally 
applied in a way that gives a great deal of weight to whether a premise of an 
argument or its conclusion is intuitively plausible. I discuss this method in more 
detail in section 4. 
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ethics.18According to Rawls, intuitions that represent earnest and 
stable considered judgments are of central importance when evaluating 
a theory of justice.19 If a coherent theory, such as utilitarianism, 
clashes with people’s case-based intuitions about what justice 
requires, Rawls views this class of intuitions as a reason to reject 
the theory, despite its other theoretical virtues.20  
A model of justice is extensionally adequate if it brings people's 
theoretical intuitions into coherence with their specific intuitions 
about how just distribution would look. Rawls claims his model of 
justice as fairness is “a better match with our considered judgments 
on reflection” than competing models.21 He then writes, “Thus, 
justice as fairness moves us closer to the philosophical ideal; it does 
not, of course, achieve it” (Rawls 1971, 50). After all, Rawls 
acknowledges, it is unclear whether reflective equilibrium 
converges on a unique answer. “It would be useless, however, to 
speculate about these matters,” Rawls writes, going on to say that 
if nothing else “if we should be able to characterize one (educated) 
person’s sense of justice, we should have a good beginning toward 
a theory of justice” in the same way that understanding one 
person’s sense of grammar is likely to reveal the general structure 
of a language (ibid.). 
Another desideratum for models is parsimony. Parsimonious 
models are more useful because it is easier to see how the model 
 
18 See, e.g., Kagan 2001, Harman 2014. Other philosophers question whether 
there is a single thing that we could call ‘intuitions,’ and if so, if they can be 
considered as evidence in conceptual analysis or moral theorizing.  
19 For a further discussion of the distinction (if any) between intuitions and 
considered judgments see Daniels 2003. 
20 Freeman 2007, 33. Cf. Rawls 1971, 47-53 
21 For Rawls, these “traditional doctrines” were utilitarianism and what he called 
perfectionism. Rawls 1971, 123. 
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generates predictions, explanations, or justifications and to identify 
points of disagreement. And as Williamson writes, 
 
the more adjustable parts a model has, the more opportunities it 
offers the model-builder to rig the results, to gerrymander the model 
by setting parameters and arranging structure in ad hoc ways to fit 
preconceived prejudices. Simplicity, elegance, symmetry, naturalness, 
and similar virtues are indications that the results have not been so 
rigged. Such virtues may thus ease us into making unexpected 
discoveries and alert us to our errors.22  
 
The temptation to rig the results is strong in political 
philosophy, where people have very strong normative intuitions 
about justice, and there is reason to suspect that those intuitions 
may be unreliable, driven by identitarian or partisan biases.23 A 
model of justice is parsimonious if it is simple and precise. A model 
of justice is simple if it does not contain so many parameters that 
it becomes unclear which considerations explain the models' 
implications about a just distribution of resources. A model of 
justice is precise if each parameter is described in a way that is clear 
and observable. For example, anyone adapting or applying the 
model should be able to easily know what each parameter entails 
and what it would mean for that parameter to change. 
The temptation to rig the results is even stronger in political 
philosophy where people evaluate theories partly based on whether 
they get the "right" results. For this reason, the value of parsimony 
weighs against the value of extensional adequacy. More 
parsimonious models present fewer opportunities for the theorist 
to deliver her preferred conclusions about particular cases. A very 
parsimonious model is more likely to deliver results that are 
 
22 Cf. Williamson, forthcoming. 
23 Cf. Ivengar and Westwood 2015. 
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extensionally inadequate because it is unlikely to offer many 
opportunities for adjustment and accommodation to people's 
intuitions. In contrast, a perfectly extensionally adequate model 
would simply be a report of the modeler’s observations and 
intuitions, and it would not have independent explanatory or 
predictive power.  
A third virtue is specification. A model is under-specified if it 
does not generate a determinate, specific outcome. A model of 
distributive justice is under-specified if people can use it to support 
a very broad range of distributive principles. On the face of it, 
Rawls's theory doesn't appear under-specified because the theory 
supports two fairly explicit principles, and Rawls defends a specific 
interpretation of those principles. Yet the same theory, in other 
hands, has deployed Rawls's two principles to support greatly 
divergent principles. If the purpose of a theory of distributive 
justice is to represent or explain the conditions when some 
distribution of resources is just, then the model is under-specified 
if it marks out a range of conditions that could be just, even if 
Rawls and Rawlsians don’t see it that way. Under-specification for 
models of distributive justice is especially objectionable if it marks 
out conditions that are inconsistent with each other. Sometimes, 
libertarians argue that their interpretation of justice as fairness is 
entirely with the standard account (e.g., when they argue that, 
empirically, libertarian policies are the best route to Rawlsian 
justice).  
If a model is under-specified, it may seem more likely to be 
extensionally adequate to the extent that people can adapt it to fit 
with their considered judgments. But if a model is under-specified, 
it is extensionally inadequate in a different sense—when people 
disagree about which adaptation or interpretation of the model is 
the correct one. In these cases, the model itself cannot adjudicate 
these disputes because people could deploy the model and get 
Philosophy and Public Issues – Liberalism and Social Justice 
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different results without misinterpreting the model in any way.24 
And then, if people must appeal to other values to defend the 
version of the model that yields their favored specification, the 




Justice as fairness has a lot of moving parts. Rawls’s view of 
reflective equilibrium allows ‘extensional adequacy’ to outweigh 
theoretical parsimony.25 Justice as fairness is not parsimonious. So 
Rawlsians can pull the levers and turn the gears of the theory at 
many different points, which creates problems of specification. 
For this reason, the model can support a range of different 
conclusions, which reflect the different dispositions of the people 
who deploy it. This feature of Rawls’s model makes it difficult to 
make progress in debates about distributive justice because 
theorists who take on the theory from different starting points can 
use the same Rawlsian premises to deliver conclusions from 
democratic socialism to market democracy.  
 
24 Rawls makes a similar point, not about justice as fairness, but about 
metaphysical views of the self, epistemology, and scientific knowledge. As I am 
using the term, Rawls thought these theories were underspecified in that they 
did not mark out a specific moral theory or conception of justice as the right 
one. For example, against Hare, Rawls argued that a conceptual analysis of moral 
terms could not itself justify utilitarianism on the grounds that moral terms 
contain certain formal properties. My claim is that Rawls's view is underspecified 
in a similar way, in that a range of views are, in principle, compatible with the 
principles Rawls defends (Freeman 2007, 312). 
25 Freeman 2007, 32. 
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This point is related to, but distinct, from more general critiques 
of reflective equilibrium that suggest that the method is too 
conservative because it privileges widely shared judgments over 
revisionary claims.26 A substantial challenge to reflective 
equilibrium in political philosophy is that it is especially sensitive 
to the speaker or audience's pre-philosophical intuitions about 
cases or theories, and people using the method could arrive at 
different conclusions without misapplying the method in any 
way.27 An added challenge for arguments about justice as fairness 
is that they not only rely on reflective equilibrium, but the Rawlsian 
theoretical architecture presents so many opportunities for good 
faith interpretive disagreements that the theory rules out very few 
conclusions at the outset. 
Here is an example of how justice as fairness is unable to 
adjudicate disputes between competing interpretations of the 
model. Rawlsians claim that justice as fairness requires protecting 
basic liberties and promoting distributive justice. Libertarians grant 
these principles but interpret the first principle of justice in a way 
that includes economic liberty is one of the basic liberties worth 
protecting. Orthodox Rawlsians reject this interpretation of the 
basic liberties.  
Here is another example. Freeman argues that public officials 
should enforce limits on freedom of contract because unlimited 
freedom of contract would entail that people could voluntarily sell 
themselves into slavery, and officials would be required to uphold 
those contracts.28 Presumably, Freeman presents the fact that 
 
26 Cf. Cath 2016. 
27 Cf. Kelly and McGrath 2010. 
28 It is also worth noting that many libertarians, including Murray Rothbard, 
endorse a conception of freedom of contract that is very similar to Freeman’s. 
So endorsement of voluntary servitude agreements is surely not essential to 
libertarianism. For an overview of these arguments see Block 2003.  
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protecting economic liberty as basic would, in practice, make 
people complicit in upholding voluntary servitude agreements as a 
reductio of libertarianism. At the same time, I imagine that the fact 
that protecting freedom of expression as basic would make people 
at public universities complicit in protecting illiberal and offensive 
speech is not a reductio of liberalism. This aspect of the argument 
illustrates the earlier point about reflective equilibrium. The 
outcome of Rawls’s theory of justice is very sensitive to people's 
pre-theoretic intuitions people view a counterintuitive implication 
of freedom of contract as disqualifying for economic liberty but do 
not take a similarly counterintuitive implication of freedom of 
speech as disqualifying that liberty. 
More generally, Rawlsians agree that public officials should 
tolerate some illiberal behavior, such as illiberal speech in public 
spaces. And they agree that officials should accommodate some 
illiberal acts, such as hierarchical and illiberal marriages, or illiberal 
religious practices that require public accommodation. Libertarians 
may interpret this case for accommodation to support 
accommodation for some illiberal economic arrangements as 
well.29 On behalf of orthodox Rawlsians, Freeman rejects this 
interpretation, on the grounds that economic contracts are 
importantly different from private social and cultural agreements.30 
On this point, Freeman introduces a distinction between economic 
and non-economic contracts and then deploys that distinction to 
justify limits on economic contracts. Similarly, Rawls and Freeman 
distinguish personal property from productive property. 
Libertarians deny the assertion that these distinctions track 
qualitatively difficult activities. They argue that to the extent that 
 
29 Flanigan 2017. 
30 As an aside, it’s unclear why educational contracts and nonprofits would be 
non-economic here. Freeman 2018, 182.  
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institutions uphold freedom of association, religious liberty, 
occupational freedom, and the right to personal property, they 
should also uphold economic liberty that includes the right to own 
productive property and make contracts.31 So Libertarians arrive at 
substantially different conclusions by denying a single distinction 
while accepting the rest of the view. Or, they could deny a different 
part of the model, such as Freeman’s suggestion that freedom of 
contract and the right to own productive property is not essential 
to the development of the moral powers. Because the model has 
so many moving parts, motivated reasoners in all corners can 
adjust and interpret various distinctions to arrive very divergent 
conclusions about justice. 
Another example. Rawlsians support the difference principle, 
which requires that social and economic inequalities should be 
arranged to the benefit of the least advantaged. Libertarians argue 
that the difference principle supports welfare state capitalism, 
which requires protections for freedom of contract and property 
rights because this system is the most likely to support long-run 
growth, which maximally benefits the least advantaged.32 
Proponents of property-owning democracy argue that this claim 
results from a misinterpretation of the difference principle, which 
“should not be interpreted to require maximizing long-run income 
growth” but should focus instead on those who are currently the 
least advantaged.33 Or they argue that the institution of freedom of 
contract should ensure that economic contracts are to the benefit 
of the least advantaged, in addition to a broadly progressive 
approach to taxation and property.34  
 
31 Freiman and Thrasher 2019, 33. 
32 Tomasi 2013; Brennan 2007. 
33 Lister 2018.  
34 Freeman 2018, 167-194.  
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One last example-- this time with socialists. Cohen argues that 
the difference principle should apply to individual attitudes and 
choices as well as institutions. Freeman replies that “these 
arguments misinterpret the nature and role of Rawls’s principles of 
justice, especially the difference principle,” because the difference 
principle is correctly understood as a non-consequentialist 
representation of what “democratic reciprocity at the deepest 
level” would look like in a society. A proponent of Cohen’s 
position may reply that this either begs the question against his 
view by defining the difference principle in a way that only applies 
to institutions, or that the “democratic reciprocity at the deepest 
level” would inform individual attitudes as well as the structure of 
institutions. And so on.  
Many of these debates take a similar form. Orthodox Rawlsians 
claim that the correct interpretation of some aspect of the Rawlsian 
model (M) rules out libertarianism, or socialism, or whatever. 
Proponents of these views reply that such an interpretation M 
either begs the question against their view by ruling it out via 
definition, or they offer an alternative interpretation of M. 
Orthodox Rawlsians come back with the claim that the 
unorthodox interpretation of M conflicts with their considered 
judgments, and so they reject that the best version of the theory 
supports unorthodox conclusions. The unorthodox reply that the 
orthodox interpretation conflicts with their considered judgments, 
and so they reject the orthodox interpretation.35  
The Rawlsian framework is flexible enough for libertarians to 
agree with orthodox Rawlsian premises while adapting them to 
deliver libertarian conclusions. This aspect of the view is only a 
limitation to the extent that justice as fairness aspires to give 
general, determinate guidance about how the basic structure of 
 
35 Some press a parallel claim in the philosophy of religion. See Draper and 
Nichols 2013. 
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society should look. It's not clear that it must, though. In the 
original version of A Theory of Justice, Rawls writes, “reflective 
equilibrium . . . is a notion characteristic of the study of principles 
which govern actions shaped by self-examination” (Rawls 1971, 
48). But Rawls’s framework aspires to more than self-reflection. 
Orthodox Rawlsians present justice as fairness as a framework that 
can tell us all how to live together. This is why they assert that 
libertarians are mistaken, rather than just different, when they read 





Just as models must make tradeoffs between parsimony and 
extensional adequacy, models also must make tradeoffs between 
degrees of idealization and degrees of realism. All models are, to 
varying degrees, idealizations. In moral and political philosophy, all 
models of justice make tradeoffs between realism and idealism. 
Justice as fairness is a model of a “realistic utopia” that aims to take 
people as they are by assuming that people respond to incentives 
and act in their self-interest (realism) while also telling what they 
should aim for (idealism).36 The best case for this intermediate level 
of idealization is that the theory can be psychologically convincing 
 
36 This is why, on the one hand, Freeman responds to Sen's argument that the 
Rawlsian project is excessively idealized, by pointing out that political 
communities need ideals by which they can judge current policies. But on the 
other hand, Freeman also rejects the utopianism of anarchists like GA Cohen 
and libertarians like Jason Brennan on the grounds that principles of justice must 
be psychologically realistic and engaged with public concerns. 
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without entrenching injustice.37 The best case against this 
intermediate level of idealization is that it describes a conception 
of citizens that is idealized in a way that makes the theory 
inapplicable to existing people and institutions while also failing to 
describe a vision of society that really is morally best.38 
 David Enoch makes a similar point about idealization in 
arguing against public reason liberalism. Enoch’s point generalizes 
to other aspects of Rawls’s framework that appeal to an 
intermediate level of idealization. Enoch begins with a theory of 
when idealization is appropriate. He argues that it is appropriate to 
idealize when the reason for idealization is consistent with the 
 
37 In a way, this problem is similar to three other criticisms of the Rawlsian 
project – criticisms of the concept of legitimacy, the original position, and public 
reason. Against the concept of legitimacy, critics ask why a society should 
tolerate unjust policies (entrenching injustice) simply because they meet some 
procedural criterion, which is, by stipulation, not a criterion related to justice but 
some other value? On the other hand, rejecting procedural constraints seemingly 
undermines the stability of the liberal project because people are unlikely to 
support or comply with political decisions they didn’t have any opportunity to 
influence (failing to take people as they are). Or, against the original position, 
critics argue that Rawls’s model idealizes away most of what matters for political 
disagreement (failing to take people as they are) or that it entrenches too many 
of people’s unjust dispositions (entrenching injustice). Against public reason, 
critics allege that orthodox Rawlsians cannot defend an intermediate level of 
idealization about who counts as ‘reasonable’ because the reasons in favor of 
excluding the unreasonable are also seemingly reasons to exclude the reasonable 
but unjust (failing to take people as they are). Yet any reason to include unjust 
or illiberal views is also a reason to include unreasonable views (entrenching 
injustice). Freeman 2018. 
38 Note that this objection is distinct from the worry that ideal theory does not 
deliver achievable and desirable solutions to institutional failures. (See 
Stemplowska 2008) I grant that a theory can be valuable even if it does not 
deliver these results. My claim is that any reason to idealize to the point that 
Rawls does is a reason to idealize further or to favor a theory that does deliver 
an achievable and desirable solution. 
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underlying motivation for the view and not introduced as an ad-
hoc way of avoiding obvious counterexamples.39 There must be a 
rationale for idealization that explains why this kind and this level of 
idealization is informative for explaining the underlying 
phenomenon.  
As an example of intermediate idealization, consider Enoch’s 
case of public reason theories of legitimacy. If legitimacy requires 
justifying state power to the actual people who are subject to them, 
then no actual states are legitimate. Rawlsians are not anarchists. 
They seek a theory that can explain how states can be legitimate 
while accounting for the idea that legitimacy does require some 
kind of justification. Rawlsians then argue that states are legitimate 
if they can be justified to people under some idealized 
conditions—either if they can be justified to everyone except the 
unreasonable or if they can be justified by considering what people 
would endorse under hypothetical conditions. Enoch replies that 
these idealized conditions are not related to the underlying 
motivation for the view (justifying state action to those who are 
actually subject to it) and that they are also ad hoc because they 
define unreasonable people or idealized conditions a way that is 
not theoretically motivated, but which neatly rules out any 
counterexamples that would be a challenge to the view. 
A similar dynamic plays out in Rawlsian discussions of 
distributive justice. Say that motivation for Rawls’s theory of 
distributive justice is to describe an economic order that respects 
every person’s status as a free and equal member of society. The 
original position achieves this by describing the economic 
institutions that people would support under conditions that 
prompt them to consider the economic order impartially.40 But the 
 
39 See Enoch 2015. 
40 Freeman 2007, 126. 
Philosophy and Public Issues – Liberalism and Social Justice 
86 
 
difference principle describes institutions that would be supported 
under conditions of full compliance, or what Rawls sometimes 
describes as “nearly full compliance”.41 This is the level of 
idealization that encounters a problem like the one Enoch 
identifies with public reason theories. The justification for the 
idealization to full compliance is not motivated by the theory's 
aspiration to model what people would choose under impartial 
conditions. Rather, the idea is that it is necessary to know what 
principles people would support in ideal conditions of full 
compliance in order to know what principles people should 
support in non-ideal conditions that fell short of full compliance.42  
But idealizing on the dimension of compliance, rather than 
some other dimension, potentially stacks the deck in favor of the 
difference principle by building into the concept of full compliance 
a level of compliance that rules out compliance with a more robust 
egalitarian or altruistic ethos but rules in compliance that exceeds 
the levels of compliance in existing societies. As in the case of 
public reason then, the idealization of full compliance is unrelated 
to the underlying motivation for the view (modeling what people 
would choose under impartial conditions) and idealizing in this way 
is also potentially ad hoc, because it defines a level of compliance 
in a way that rules out alternative conceptions of distributive justice 
that would be a challenge to the difference principle. 
 This intermediate level of idealization on the dimension of 
compliance results in a kind of intractability that is similar to what 
Enoch observes in discussions of public reason. When libertarians 
discuss distributive justice in ideal theory, they claim that ideally, 
people who complied with principles of just acquisition and 
transfer would comply with property rules that enabled them to 
 
41 For a further discussion of this point see Freiman 2017, 13.  
42 Freeman 2007, 472. 
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arrive at non-statist solutions to public goods problems, and the 
best society would be a capitalist one.43  
Rawlsian critics reply that such an argument is unrealistic and 
that capitalism is structured in a way that necessarily causes vast 
concentrations of wealth and persistent inequality – no amount of 
compliance with principles of justice can solve these structural 
problems.44 So at the other end of the idealization spectrum, 
economists and libertarians may acknowledge that inequalities of 
class and wealth are a consequence of people acting in their own 
self-interest rather than complying with the rules of just 
institutions. But they then argue that the disadvantages of self-
interested behavior weigh against governmental solutions because 
non-compliant people would capture the coercive power of the 
state for their own advantage.45 On this view, the fact that people 
are not immune from self-interest and free-riding is a reason to 
avoid concentrating power in political institutions where 
monopoly power is even more destructive than monopoly power 
in the marketplace.46  
Either way, at the level of ideal theory or at the level of non-
ideal theory, libertarians argue that the difference principle is not 
supported. To deliver the difference principle, the idealization of 
full or nearly full compliance must be interpreted in a way that is 
 
43 Cf. Brennan 2014; Freiman 2017.  
44 Property owning democracy and liberal socialism, Freeman writes, are more 
likely to achieve the Difference Principle than capitalism because capitalism “by 
nature” creates substantial inequalities and a privileged class of people who 
control most of the productive wealth. Freeman 2018, 127 
45 Freiman calls this the behavioral symmetry standard. Freiman 2017.  
46 Freiman’s point is that if some other system could, at its best, be superior to 
capitalism, it must be compared to capitalism at its best as well. If capitalism fails 
because of individual corruption, free-riding, weakness of will, or inefficiency, 
these factors are also likely to weigh against alternative political and economic 
arrangements with equal force. 
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controversial to libertarian interlocutors. When libertarians 
disagree with the claim that the economic order would resemble 
the difference principle in ideal theory, they needn’t reject the 
Rawlsian aspiration to understand justice by modeling what people 
would choose under impartial conditions where everyone 
complied with justice. Rather, they deny the intermediate level of 
idealization involved in the Rawlsian interpretation of compliance.  
 A similar move occurs in Rawlsian discussions of economic 
freedom. Consider Freeman’s claim that distributive justice “would 
not permit the laissez-faire doctrine of caveat emptor” and that the 
difference principle would support implied warranties in contracts 
that ensured consumer protection, laws against predatory lending, 
and the unconscionability doctrine in contract law.47 On Freeman’s 
view, the laissez-faire doctrine of caveat emptor would be incompatible 
with promoting a fair distribution of advantage, even if it included 
the standard protections that proponents of a laissez-faire system 
endorse, such as laws against fraud and misbranding. But here 
again, it’s unclear what level of idealization to apply to this claim. 
In practice, limiting the public enforcement of contracts can be 
counter-productive because it limits the options of the least-
advantaged and may cause some people to resort to privately 
enforced lending and labor agreements, which are not subject to 
democratic oversight and which potentially riskier than public 
enforcement.48 In principle, laws against fraud and misbranding 
should be sufficient to ensure consumer protection, and 
restrictions on people’s ability to freely negotiate the terms of their 
labor or to decide what to buy would be paternalistic.  
 Or, return to Freeman’s voluntary slavery argument. 49 Freeman 
argues that since “contract and property are matters of publicly 
 
47 Freeman 2018. 181 
48 Cf. Flanigan 2017.  
49 This view is similar to Seanna Shiffrin’s (2000).  
Jessica Flanigan – The Rawlsian Mirror of Justice 
89 
 
enforceable right,” upholding voluntary slavery contracts consists 
in imposing duties on all citizens that they respect their fellow 
citizens’ private agreements as valid, as long as people voluntarily 
agreed to the terms.50 But in ideal theory, Jason Brennan argues 
that if people all complied with principles of justice, and all people 
had a substantial social safety net, then they would not engage in 
exploitation and voluntary slavery agreements would not be an 
issue. Or, Chris Freiman argues that public officials' refusal to 
uphold such contracts is consistent with libertarianism since 
people's rights to make contracts do not include rights to public 
enforcement.  
At the other end of the spectrum of idealization, the closest 
thing to voluntary slavery agreements currently arise in 
circumstances where people’s institutions have failed them so 
much that they are willing to migrate and work in a different 
illiberal society where they lack legal rights and are obligated to 
work until the end of their labor agreement.51 In these cases, 
Freeman’s objection that “society is called upon …treat a person 
not as a being with rights due moral consideration and respect, but 
as property” doesn’t apply.52 The presence of these labor 
agreements reflects a preexisting lack of moral consideration and 
respect for foreigners, which is embedded in public institutions, 
not the other way around. And because voluntary slavery 
agreements generally arise in conditions that are already illiberal, so 
they do not call upon liberal members of a society or liberal public 
officials to uphold and enforce agreements that are contrary to 
liberal values. Moreover, in these unfortunate circumstances, no 
 
50 Freeman 2018, 66. 
51 This may describe the experiences of migrants who work in Qatar, for 
example, where the legal system grants foreign workers very few legal rights and 
workers are very vulnerable to fraud and abuse. Cf. Morin 2013.  
52 Freeman 2018, 66. 
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one who is discussing distributive justice, including libertarians, 
would defend the fraudulent and abusive conditions that 
characterize most of these arrangements, even if libertarians 
would, in principle, support the enforcement of a truly consensual 
agreement that took this form. On the libertarian view, the 
problem with seemingly voluntary slavery agreements isn't that 
public officials and citizens are expected to uphold them. The 
problem is that too often, such agreements are not actually 
voluntary. So, at either end of the spectrum of institutional 
idealization, voluntary slavery agreements do not require public 
officials to uphold and enforce contracts that are inconsistent with 
liberal values.  
Freeman does not direct his argument against libertarianism at 
the level of fully ideal theory or at the level of actual policy. The 
intermediate level of institutional idealization derives principles of 
justice by imagining that people are better than they are, but only 
in particular ways. 
  
Conclusions 
So far, I introduced a problem – which is that libertarians and 
orthodox Rawlsians talk past each other because the theory is 
under-specified. Orthodox Rawlsians write as if the theory clearly 
delivers their preferred specification, but it can’t be that clear if 
libertarians keep disagreeing! At this point, it may seem that the 
solution to the problem would be to refine and specify the 
Rawlsian framework even further, to make it even clearer so that 
it delivers more determinate results. Yet this exercise is what 
generated the problem in the first place. As philosophers refined 
their versions of orthodox and unorthodox Rawlsiansism to 
deliver more determinate results, the theory became more specified 
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for those who were developing it but less plausible to people who 
disagreed.  
Justice as fairness begins as a single path, but it cannot end in a 
single place. In order to know which theory of distributive justice 
is the right one, it’s not enough to consult justice as fairness 
because it doesn’t rule out much. Rather, the theorist must appeal 
to other values in order to explain why she chose to take the path 
of property-owning democracy, rather than market democracy, as 
she walked the Rawlsian path. But then, once we reach the 
intersection and it’s time to make that choice and justice as fairness 
cannot help, it’s unclear why we walked down the path in the first 
place. Rather than talking about justice as fairness, which can 
support a range of interpretations about distributive justice, the 
theorist of justice may as well just argue for her favored theory of 
distributive justice in its own right.53 
The foregoing discussion of Rawlsian distributive justice 
illustrates the broader point. Libertarian proponents of freedom of 
contract argue that Freeman is holding the liberties he values 
(speech, expression) to lower justificatory standards than he 
applies to economic liberties, but that the Rawlsian framework 
should support the basic status of economic freedom, even if that 
would require revisions or reinterpretations of Rawls’s theory of 
 
53 David Enoch makes a similar point about public reason liberalism. Rather 
than talking about whether a view is reasonable or whether public reason 
liberalism can support it, people should just debate the merits of a view 
straightforwardly. On Enoch’s view, people should focus their disagreement on 
the content of what they disagree about, not on whether the parties to the 
disagreement are reasonable. Similarly, I am arguing that people should focus 
their conversations about justice on the considerations in favor of theory A or 
B, rather than focusing on whether the interpretation of justice as fairness that 
supports theory A or B is correct. Cf. Enoch 2013 and Enoch, Against Public 
Reason. 
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distributive justice. Orthodox Rawlsian reply that the Rawlsian 
framework does not support the basic status of economic freedom, 
because libertarians are misinterpreting what it means for a liberty 
to play a role in the development of citizens’ moral powers, so no 
revisions to the Rawlsian theory of distributive justice are needed. 
The disagreement about freedom of contract shifts to a dispute 
about the meaning of terms like “moral powers” of “basic liberty” 
rather than addressing the substantive issue of whether public 
officials may permissibly limit citizens’ ability to make legally 
binding contracts.54 This is a methodological point, and a similar 
point might arise in discussions of the Rawlsian methodology itself. 
Methodological objections can be re-cast as misinterpretations of 
the procedure or of concepts like “considered judgment,” rather 
than refuted with arguments about how to make tradeoffs between 
theoretical virtues. 
Perhaps it’s time to travel off the beaten paths. The Rawlsian 
model gave us a way of talking about the different ways that 
institutions affect our lives, and it clarified the terms of important 
debates about the value of freedom and extent that public officials 
should uphold particular property rules, create public services, and 
enforce protections for various liberties. But the Rawlsian model 
doesn’t tell us what theory of distributive justice is correct. Because 
the model has many moving parts and because its standards of 
evaluation depend so much on whether the model yields 
“extensionally adequate conclusions,” Rawlsian arguments may 
now tell us more about their Rawlsian authors than they tell us 
about justice.  
Katrina Forrester recently arrived at a similar conclusion on 
different grounds. She writes, 
 
54 Cf. Chalmers 2011. 




Perhaps it is time to see the dominant philosophical liberalism of 
the late twentieth century not as the primary resource for political 
philosophers but as one doctrine among many and to understand 
Rawls's theory as a discrete chapter in the history of political 
thought.55 
 
How might political philosophy look going forward? My 
tentative suggestion is that the aforementioned concerns about 
reflective equilibrium and intermediate levels of idealization weigh 
in favor of a more piecemeal approach at the level of non-ideal 
theory and a simpler, more unified approach to theorizing about 
justice at the level of ideal theory.  
To illustrate the more piecemeal approach, recent entries in 
libertarian political philosophy may be a helpful guide. When they 
are not addressing orthodox Rawlsianism directly, libertarians 
generally argue against specific policies from a pluralistic moral 
foundation. For example, they argue against existing restrictions 
on specific liberties, such as limits on the right to own a business, 
minimum wage laws, maximum hour laws, occupational licensing 
requirements, the right to hire immigrants, bans on payday lending, 
zoning regulations, and laws that criminalize entire occupations, 
e.g., sex work, and policies that empower public officials to seize 
people's property for the sake of public projects. Feminist critics of 
Rawls take up a similar strategy. 56 In contrast, Freeman does not 
discuss any of these policies at length—most go unmentioned. But 
if the foregoing arguments are right, the Rawlsian approach could 
 
55 Forrester 2019, 279. 
56 See e.g. Okin’s discussion of Rwals. Jaggar expands on the methodological 
implications of Okin’s critique. Cf. Okin 1989 and Jaggar 2015.  
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weigh in favor (or against) any of these policies in the right (or 
wrong) hands. If so, then the Rawlsian apparatus is unlikely to be 
especially helpful in informing specific policy debates or advancing 
revisionary, new positions.57 
A disadvantage of the piecemeal approach is that it’s difficult to 
know why the proposals on offer are the right ones without 
appealing to a general, theoretical model. For this reason, simple, 
abstract, theoretical frameworks are useful for identifying 
inconsistencies in people’s beliefs and thereby challenging people’s 
beliefs about public policy. These ideal theories can inform how 
we evaluate existing institutions, or they can simply serve as a 
vision of the truth.58 Understood in this light, maybe the Rawlsian 
framework is one ideal theory among many.59 But if orthodox 
Rawlsianism aims to serve as an ideal that informs existing 
institutions, then its indeterminacy undermines the usefulness of 
the theory even as a guiding ideal. And even if orthodox 
Rawlsianism could deliver a determinate vision of the truth of how 
we ought to live together, other ideals are seemingly more 
appealing. 
 
57 Hare makes a point like this. Hare 1973, 145 writes, “Since the theoretical 
structure is tailored at every point to fit Rawls’ intuitions, it is hardly surprising 
that its normative consequences fit them too – if they did not, he would alter 
the theory ... and the fact that Rawls is a fairly typical man of his times and 
society, and will therefore have many adherents, does not make this a good way 
of doing philosophy.” 
58 Estlund 2019. 
59 As Forrester writes, rejecting Rawls’s model as the primary resource debates 
in political philosophy opens up new possibilities, where proponents can defend 
theories of justice on equal footing, each as one doctrine among many, on their 
own terms rather than on the contested and slippery terms that have evolved 
over the last half-century of Rawlsian discourse. 
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Catholics call Mary the Mirror of Justice because she is without 
sin, so she can perfectly represent an image of God’s goodness. 
The face of God is surely a compelling ideal. But Rawls was 
dismissive of a religious approach to justice.60 So in justice as 
fairness, Rawls created his own mirror of justice, which aimed to 
present a secular image of how we could live together.61 Like the 
image of Mary, justice as fairness is offered as a tool. But when we 
see things in Rawls’s mirror, we see them dimly. We see only part 
of what justice requires because we can’t see beyond our own 
distorted reflection. It’s time to put down the looking glass and see 
each other face to face.  
 
 











60 Freeman 2018, 9-11  
61 For a further discussion of the claim that Rawls was still, in some way, engaged 
in a theological project, see Nelson 2019. 
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